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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JAYE SMITH CONSTRUCTION CO.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 14497

vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION, GRANITE
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was brought by plaintiff to recover the actual
costs of Weyerhaeuser Blue Star and Red Star decking used by
plaintiff in the construction of the Kearns athletic addition
and on the gymnasium floor at the Kearns Junior High physical
education addition.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judgment was granted by Stewart M. Hanson after trial for
the full amount prayed for by plaintiff in his Complaint, plus
the additional $150.00 for the striping which had been performed
by plaintiff.

Total amount of the judgment was $5,591.30.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Granite School District, defendant, seeks to have the
judgment of the lower court reversed and judgment entered in
favor of itself and against the plaintiff no cause of action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff will restate the facts that it considers
supported by a fair, full and careful examination of the whole
record.
Plaintiff's claim arises out of a construction project
which he completed for the defendant at the Kearns Junior High
School physical education addition.

He claims the actual cost of

Weyerhaeuser Blue Star and Red Star decking installed which was
unavailable at the time of the bid opening, but was required by
the plans and specifications.
The following facts are undisputed:
(a)

The proposal form, plaintiff's bid, Exhibit 10-P,

dated March 6, 19 73 had enclosed with it the letter of March 6,
1973, Exhibit 11-P, which advised the School Board of the problem
relating to the Weyerhaeuser decking;
(b)

The facts stated in the letter of March 6, 1973

relating to the decking were true.

The material was not: available,

was not being manufactured, and no accurate determination of price
could be made for the material at the time of the bid opening;
(c)

The plans, specifications, all documents and addenda

entitled "Physical Education Addition, Kearns Junior High School",
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were made a part of the proposal form by reference and were the
basis of the proposal form and the ultimate agreement, Exhibit 12-P;
(d)

The plans and specifications required the use of

Weyerhaeuser Blue Star and Weyerhaeuser Red Star heavy decking
and that material was actually installed by plaintiff;
(e)

Plaintiff advised the School District, by and through

its designated agent Arthur K. Olsen, the architect, on May 23, 1973,
that the decking had been obtained and that the price was higher
than quoted and restated the original term of the letter of March 6,
1973, Exhibit 11-P (See Exhibit 15-P).
(f)

Defendant permitted plaintiff to proceed with the

installation of the Weyerhaeuser Blue Star and Weyerhaeuser Red
Star heavy decking without objection, knowing of the increased
expense, and accepted plaintiff's work;
(g)

Plaintiff made its claim promptly for the additional

cost (Exhibit 15-P).

It became a matter of discussion between

the architect and the School District officials during the
construction period (See Inter-School District correspondence,
Exhibits 16-P and 7-D);
(h)

The material specified actually cost what plaintiff

paid and his charges were reasonable;
(i)

Change order No. 3, Exhibit 20-P, was actually approved

by the architect Arthur K. Olsen, who is designated in * the agreement
as the agent for the defendant with whom the contractor must
resolve his differences;
(j)

The painting addition for basketball lines on the
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gymnasium floor, amounting to $150.00, was also the subject of
a change order approved by the architect and submitted to the
defendant.

A copy of said claim was a part of the plaintiff's

Answers to Interrogatories filed with the court and mailed to
defendant's attorney on the 18th of November, 1974;
(k)

Defendant has refused to pay either of the items that

the plaintiff claims are due.
There is a dispute in the testimony and a direct: contradiction
as to whether or not the inability of the contractors to obtain a
supply or a quote as to price for the Weyerhaeuser decking at the
time of the bid opening was called to the School

Board's attention.

Plaintiff's testimony is clear to the effect that such problem
was called to the Board's attention.

Board witnesses do not

recall such an event and the minutes of meeting at which the bids
were opened do not reflect a reference to the letter, Exhibit P-11,
which was with plaintiff's bid proposal.
The amount of the proposal form was placed in defendant's
form contract which became Exhibit 12-P.

The agreement provides

that Arthur K. Olsen, the architect, is the person authorized by
defendant to supervise the construction.

The contract provides

that if the architect provides additional drawings and specifications
the contractor shall perform, execute and complete the work in
accordance with such additional drawings (Pg A-2, Exhibit 12-P).
Paragraph 2 of 12-P provides that the contractor will
follow generally the directions of the architect and that the
architect's interpretation of the drawings and specifications
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

shall be conclusive on the parties to the agreement.

The third

paragraph provides again that the architect's direction shall
govern the contractor's decisions in choosing material.

The

fourth paragraph provides that the contractor shall not deviate
from the drawings or specifications or execute any extra work of
any kind unless authorized in writing by the architect.

The amount

to be paid, allowed or deducted on account of any such alterations
or extra work, if any, shall be stated in writing or provisions
made for the determination thereof in said written authorization.
The eleventh paragraph of the agreement provides that there will
be paid the basic sum of $164,022.00 subject to additions and
deductions as herein provided and subject to the provisions of the
agreement.

The fifteenth paragraph of the agreement provides that

the architect's decision as to the true meaning of the plans and
specifications, performance of work or completion of jobs, shall
be final and conclusive upon the parties.
The obtaining of prior written approval was a procedure
the evidence shows was not followed.
15-P, 7-D, 16-P).

(See correspondence, Exhibits

It is a common practice in the construction

business to do the work and then do the documentation (Pg 46 of Tr.).
Plaintiff obtained change orders approved by the architect
on both of the extras for which he seeks payment.
When plaintiff requested a change order approval, he then
ran into the difficulty which gives rise to the present action.
Apparently the matter came somewhat to a head immediately in a
letter dated June 26, 1973 from the architect to the District
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Supervisor.

In the letter the architect states.-

"It appears that he needs to have his contract increased
due to the bid price he used and the price he ultimately
had to pay after he finally obtained the decking.11
(Exhibit 16-P)
Defendant still refused to pay for the decking.

An

additional letter was written by the architect to the Supervisor
relating to Mr. Smith's requested changes.

It is Exhibit 8-D

dated January 8, 1974 and refers to change order No. 2 and approves
the painting of the additional lines on the floor which Mr. Smith
sought payment for in the amount of $150.00, advises that the
wood decking was still not resolved and that a meeting would have
to be held to discuss it (Exhibit 8-D).
The discussions occurred but nothing was resolved, and it
became necessary for the plaintiff to bring the action from which
this appeal arises.
After trial the court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and a Judgment which was subsequently amended and became
the final judgment of the court.

The court found the disputed

question of fact in plaintiff's favor and in Finding No. 4 found
that the letter written by plaintiff was noticed by agents of the
defendant or should have been, in the exercise of reasonable care,
noticed in the examination of the bids.

Court further found that

the qualification letter was a part of the plaintiff's bid and
became a part of the contract executed by the parties on the 12th
of March, 1973,

Court found that the defendant had received the

benefit of the decking and that equity required it to pay the
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reasonable cost and value of the materials.

In paragraph

6 of

the Findings, he further found that it would be inequitable and
constitute unjust enrichment for the defendant to require plaintiff
to furnish and bear the cost of the redwood decking without
compensation.

Court also found that the $150.00 for painting the

basketball floor was due.

The Amended Judgment granting plaintiff

judgment for the sum of $5,591.30 adjusted the period for which
interest was allowed plaintiff on the balance owing as found by
the court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL DOCUMENTS WHICH SHED LIGHT ON MEANING OF A
CONTRACT MAY BE CONSIDERED IN INTERPRETATION.
The thrust of defendant's argument under Point I of its
brief is that the trial court could not receive in evidence and
consider Exhibit 11-P, plaintiff's note attached to the proposal
form.

The note accurately set forth a state of facts that related

to one of the items included in the proposal.

It is undisputed

that the statements in the exhibit were true.

At the time of the

bid opening, prices on this particular item could not be obtained
and a base price was included for the purpose of calculating the
bid.
Based on the proposal form, a contract was prepared
(Exhibit 12-P).

It refers to the plans and specifications for the

building, a document completely outside of the contract.
Fortunately, there is no argument about the plans and specifications.
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They include the requirement that the Red Star decking and the
Blue Star decking manufactured by Weyerhaeuser be used, and this
is the item referred to in Exhibit 11-P.
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, §628, Pg. 904, Vol. 4,
recites the general rule that documents referred to in an integrated
agreement become a part of the agreement as far as they are
incorporated by reference.

This is true even when the items such

as specifications and plans for construction are not attached to
the written agreement.

Then the Section recites as the law the

following:
"Even where a writing does not refer to another writing,
if such other writing was made as part of the same
transaction, the two should be interpreted together.Tf
Pg. 904.
Plaintiff submits that it is obvious that the proposal form,
the letter attached, the contract, the plans and specifications,
are all documents that should be referred to by the court and
interpreted together in arriving at the state of the facts on
which the parties contracted at the time of the contract.
Defendant cites for the court's consideration Bullfrog
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 28 Utah 2d 261.

Plaintiff

submits that this decision supports the basic principles that
uphold the trial court's decision.

In Bullfrog Marina, Inc., the

trial court had held that an employment agreement and a lease that
had been executed by the parties were related and that both of the
documents had to be interpreted together, even though neither
referred to the other, and set down the principle of law that
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plaintiff believes is applicable, Utah 267:
"The trial court did not err in following the rule of
law that where two or more instruments are executed by
the same parties contemporaneously, or at different
times in the course of the same transaction, and concern
the same subject matter, they will be read and construed
together so far as determining the respective rights and
interests of the parties, although they do not in terms
refer to each other."
An additional important decision that recites correctly the
law where there are more than one writing executed contemporaneously
with the contract or relating to the execution of the contract is
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773, 6 Utah 2d 98.
The court there held that where the intentions of the parties are
to be ascertained, the document itself is first considered, then
contemporaneous writings concerning the same subject matter are
considered, and third, extrinsic parol evidence of intentions may
be considered.
Plaintiff's position is that the exhibit relating to the
Weyerhaeuser decking is not an attempt to vary the terms of a
written instrument, but simply shows the state of facts at the
time the proposal form was executed.

Defendant prepared the plans

and specifications requiring Weyerhaeuser decking and should be
charged with knowledge of its unavailability and price uncertainty.
Certainly if plaintiff, after commencing the construction, had
been unable to obtain Weyerhaeuser decking and requested a right
to substitute, Exhibit 11-P would have been something the parties
would consider.

If substitution had been permitted and a higher

price material than those estimated in the bid were required, no
one would argue, it is submitted, that plaintiff would not be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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entitled to the additional allowance.

Or, by the same token, if

substitution were permitted and cheaper materials than the amount
set forth in the bid were obtained, it is obvious that a reduction
in the contract payment would be made. „,>•.'••
An even more recent case decided by the court indicating
the application of basic rules for the interpretation of contracts
to municipal corporations and other public organizations is Midwest
Realty v. City of West Jordan, Case No. 13874, decided on October 29,
1975.

There bid forms were used and minutes of council meetings

examined to determine the agreement between the parties and the
City was required to pay for the reasonable value of the advantages
and improvements it received.
When all of the documents are examined under which plaintiff
constructed the Kearns Junior High facility, plaintiff submits that
there is adequate provision for the interpretation placed on the
agreement by the trial court.
The agreement provides for adjustments as the construction
project proceeds.

The adjustments to be made by consultation and

through the architect who is designated as the defendant's
representative.

The modifications may increase or decrease the

contract price.

If work is deleted, costs are decreased.

If

added, increased.
The Weyerhaeuser Blue Star and Red Star decking were items
which the contractor foresaw would become problems in the
construction.

The material was not being manufactured and a

supply was not available, so price would be

uncertain.

Should

plaintiff now be penalized for its efforts to be fair and equitable
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in performing the contract undertaken for the School Board.
The architect, the designated agent of the Board, agreed
that the contractor is entitled to an increase in the price,

and

under the facts presented the court agreed.
It is submitted the results reached are well within the
terms of the written instruments which the court considered properly.
POINT II
CHANGE ORDERS APPROVED BY ARCHITECT MAY BE BASIS
FOR COURT'S DETERMINATION OF EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT.
Defendant, in its second point, argues that the change
orders that were executed by architect Olsen, acting as agent for
the Board, are not binding upon the Board.

It is true that no final

approval of said change orders was ever obtained by plaintiff.

Had

he been able to obtain the approval and get paid, then this matter
would not be here for the court's consideration.

The refusal to

approve was arbitrary, unreasonable, and a violation of the
agreement.
Consider first change order No. 2 for the striping of the
basketball courts.

There is no dispute about this being an extra

activity required by the contractor.

There is no dispute about

the reasonableness of the charge of $150.00.

There is no dispute

about the fact that it was done at the request of the District and
was not included in plaintiff's contract.

Yet the change order

was not approved after it had been submitted by the architect and
by plaintiff.

No objection was made by the District as the

agreement required.

At the time of the trial, witness Davidson,

who was the representative of the District during the construction
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period, testified concerning the $150.00 item:

v

"As an extra expense, I feel that the contractor be
paid for it, should at this time.M (Pg. 68, Tr. of T.)
Plaintiff might be willing to concede that the executed

change orders requested by him were not binding upon the District
until approved by someone above the level of the architect.
certainly approval could not be withheld arbitrarily.

But

In the light

of all the evidence, the payments are in fairness and equity due
to the contractor.
In a very recent decision, this court, in considering
construction contracts and their interpretation, set forth the
rule which, plaintiff submits, is applicable here.

In ZionVs Property,

Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, Pg. 1321, the court stated:
f!

We accept the correctness of plaintiff's argument
that there is implied in any contract a covenant of
good faith and cooperation, which should prevent
either party from impeding the other's performance
of his obligations thereunder;"
The court's findings do not require a finding that the
District was bound by the architect's approval of the change orders.
On the basis of the equitable principles cited, the District should
pay the charge for decking specified.

Unjust enrichment would

occur if it were not required to pay.
Both of the witnesses for defendant, that is Davidson and
Hilton, testified that many adjustments are necessary in the
construction of large projects, and the adjustments that are made
are those which the District and the contractor, in negotiation,
i

consider to be fair under all the circumstances.
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Their testimony

establishes the principle requiring fair play and good faith in
the adjusting claims.

(See Davidson, Pg. 64 of Tr. of T.; Hilton,

Pg. 80 of Tr. of T.)
The law recognizes that in every contract there is an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

(17 C.J.S.,

§328, Pg. 285-86)
A contract conferring on one party discretionary power
which affects the other party's rights imposes a duty to exercise
such discretion in good faith and in accordance with fair dealing.
California Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co., 45 C.2d 474, 289 P.2d
785.
This court in State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v.
Salisbury, 27 Utah 2d 229, 494 P.2d 529, set forth the contractual
obligation to be implied in the following language:
fl

But also to be considered in connection therewith
are the mutual responsibilities the parties have to
each other which are implied from the operation of
law applicable to such relationship. Arising from
what is commonly known and accepted as to the customs
and experience in the everyday affairs of life, the
parties each has the right to assume that the other
will perform the duties he agrees to with reasonable
care, competence, diligence and good faith, even though
such terms are not expressly spelled out in the
contract; and if failure to so perform those duties
results in damage to the other party he is entitled
to recover for breach of the contractual duties."
No evidence was presented which indicated that the adjustments
requested by plaintiff were not fair, equitable and reasonable.
The court found in accordance with the claim of plaintiff that the
items should be paid him in settlement of his contract with the
District, and that to refuse payment would be an unjust enrichment
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to the District, permitting it to take his materials without just
compensation.
POINT III

;

AMENDMENT TO INCLUDE STRIPING CHANGE WAS PROPERLY
GRANTED.
Defendant claims unfair surprise in the court's permitting
the amendment to be made to the Complaint.

It related to the

$150.00 item for striping of the basketball floor.

It was not

included in the original Complaint because plaintiff believed it
to be an item that the District never intended to dispute.

An

item which it thought the District would pay without being a part
of the litigation.
As early as January 8, 1974, the painting of additional
lines on the wood floor was approved by the architect when the
matter was discussed in April, 1974, and change orders were
prepared and submitted.

Change order No. 2 covering the striping

was not a matter to be contested.

(See Exhibit 22-P for the

reference to this item).
In addition to the references made in the exhibits referred
to, in Answers to Interrogatories during the discovery period,
Answer No. 4 on Pg. 12 of the Record on Appeal states the following
"Attached to these Answers and by this reference made
a part hereof, are the two change orders which have
been approved by the architect and forwarded to the
School Board. Neither of the change orders has been
paid. It is plaintiff's position that the modification
on contract price is provided for in the contract and
the change orders, once approved by the agent for the
School Board, namely the architect, the School Board
is then bound by said approved change and must pay the
additional price as part of the contract."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The exhibits were the change orders now in this litigation.
Rule 15 of the U.R.C.P. provides that where issues are not
raised by the pleadings, amendments may be made as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise the issues
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, and
provides that the court may allow the pleadings to be amended
when the presentation of the merits of the action xvill be served
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that
the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits.
This court, in a carefully stated interpretation of Rule
15(b) , U.R.C.P., set down the principles, plaintiff believes,
which require approval of the trial court's order permitting
amendment.

See Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, at

pg. 211:
M

?

They must all be looked to in the light of their even
more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading
and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded
the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.
What they are entitled to is notice of the issues
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this
is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our
rules provide for liberality to allow examination
into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other
party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue
if he so requests. Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P., so states.
It further allows for an amendment to conform to the
proof after trial or even after judgment, and indicates
that if the ends of justice so require, 'failure so to
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues.1 This idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c) (1),
U.R.C.P: !(E)very final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings . ! ,f
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See also Seamons v. Andersen, 122 Utah 497, 252 P.2d 209;

Morris

v. Russell, 120 Utah 545, 236 P.2d 451.
In the light of the fact that the $150.00 item had been a
matter repeatedly discussed during the time that this case was
being brought to issue and to trial and was an item that the
plaintiff had been assured there was no serious controversy about,
plaintiff submits that the claim that defendant was surprised or
prejudiced in any way by having this matter determined and
submitted to the trial court and included in the ultimate judgment
against the District seems to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed, that costs be allowed to the
plaintiff.

Respectfully submitted,
DWIGHT L. KING
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Respondent

(
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